Lawyers challenge execution of Tennessee man with intellectual disability, dementia and severe brain damage

Attorneys for a 68-year-old death row inmate set to be executed Aug. 5 are asking the Tennessee Supreme Court to reverse a lower court’s decision that declined to decide whether he is ineligible for capital punishment, reported The Tennessean. 

Byron Black has been on death row since 1989 for the Nashville murders of his ex-girlfriend Angela Clay, 29, and her two daughters, Latoya, 9, and Lakesha, 6. 

His lawyers argue that Black’s intellectual disability, along with dementia and severe brain damage, make him incompetent for execution. 

“Byron simply does not have the intellectual capacity to grasp why the State seeks to kill him, so his execution serves no legitimate penological purpose, it’s just cruel,” said his lawyer Kelley Henry, a supervisory assistant federal public defender. “Byron is an elderly man in failing health. His execution would be a grotesque and pointless exercise of state power.” 

Black, one of the longest serving death row inmates, is the second man scheduled to be executed this year after Tennessee in December announced that it would resume capital punishment following a five-year hiatus.

The state on May 22 executed Oscar Smith for the 1989 killings of his estranged wife and her two teenage sons.

Black’s lawyers have long argued that his intellectual disabilities should keep him off death row.

Davidson County District Attorney Glenn Funk has declared Black intellectually disabled and said his death sentence should be commuted. 

A trial court, however, ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to decide Black’s incompetency claim. The Tennessee Court of Appeals later denied Black’s request for a hearing on his intellectual disability claim.

According to court documents, experts have said Black is “profoundly disabled" with memory, cognition and daily functioning in the bottom 5% of people his age.

His lawyers said Black has been diagnosed with brain damage, possibly from factors including “fetal exposure to alcohol, lead exposure during childhood, and several serious head injuries.”

Black is also frail and suffers from congestive heart failure and stage 4 kidney disease, his lawyers said.

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Mississippi executes man after nearly 50 years on death row

The 24th Execution of 2025

Richard Jordan, Mississippi’s longest serving and oldest death row inmate, died by lethal injection Wednesday evening at the Mississippi State Penitentiary nearly 50 years after he kidnapped and murdered Edwina Marter, reported Mississippi Today. 

The 79-year-old Vietnam War veteran who experienced post-traumatic stress disorder was pronounced dead at 6:16 p.m. 

“First I would like to thank everyone for a humane way of doing this. I want to apologize to the victim’s family,” Jordan said, adding thanks to his wife and lawyers and asking for forgiveness. 

“I love you very much,” he said as his last words. “I will see you on the other side, all of you.”

Prison officials confirmed Jordan was unconscious after injecting a sedative before following with injection of two other injection drugs – a check ordered by a federal judge who greenlighted the execution late last week. This was part of a federal lawsuit challenging the lethal injection protocol in which Jordan was a lead plaintiff. 

In January 1976, Jordan found himself desperate for money and made a plan to kidnap the family member of a bank employee and demand funds. The Vietnam War veteran had a job lined up and had moved his family to Louisiana, only to find the position was filled, according to his clemency petition. 

He spent a few days looking for work before calling the Gulfport bank where Charles Marter worked as the commercial loan agent. Jordan found the man’s address in the phonebook and went there, posing as an electric company worker to get the banker’s wife, Edwina, to open the door at gunpoint. Her toddler son was left unharmed at home. 

Jordan had Edwina drive to the DeSoto National Forest. As she tried to run away, Jordan shot in her direction, hitting her in the head. Afterwards, he called Edwina’s husband to demand $25,000 in ransom. After two failed money drops, Jordan was arrested. 

He went to trial that year and received a death sentence, only for it to be overturned multiple times due to questions about the legality of Mississippi’s death penalty law. It wasn’t until 1998 and four trials later that the sentence stuck. Then Jordan began years of appeals. 

Eric and Kevin Marter, the now-adult sons of Edwina, and her husband Charles did not travel to Parchman to witness the execution, but Edwina’s brother planned to attend with help of his family, Kevin Marter said. 

Family members left without offering comment. 

Ahead of the execution, Eric Marter said he wanted Jordan’s sentence to be carried out sooner rather than almost 50 years later after his mother’s death. 

“I don’t want him to get what he wants,” Marter, who was 11 in 1976, said about Jordan’s efforts to fight his death sentence. 

Jordan’s wife, Marsha, witnessed the execution along with his attorney Krissy Nobile of the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel and his spiritual adviser, the Rev. Tim Murphy. Such advisers have been allowed to accompany death row inmates since a 2022 U.S. Supreme Court ruling.

After the execution, Attorney General Lynn Fitch said her office has pressed for justice and was pleased to be able to provide the Marter family, friends and the community with closure. 

Leading up to the execution, Jordan petitioned the U.S Supreme Court and the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals to step in. The appeals court denied a stay of execution Tuesday, and the high court denied request for a stay and writ of certiorari Wednesday afternoon – about an hour before the execution. 

Tuesday evening, Gov. Tate Reeves reviewed Jordan’s clemency petition and said he would not intervene in the execution, noting circumstances of the crime, how Jordan admitted his guilt, multiple trials and appeals. 

Frank Rosenblatt, a professor at the Mississippi College School of Law, submitted the clemency petition that included letters of support from at least a dozen people, including Jordan’s wife, his sister and a pastor. 

“Richard is all of these things: a patriot; a Vietnam Veteran; a man of faith; a good son, brother, and friend; and he is an exemplary inmate who has worked to prevent this type of crime from happening ever again,” Rosenblatt wrote in Jordan’s petition. 

Organizations including Death Penalty Action and Catholic Mobilizing Network circulated petitions that called on Reeves to stop Jordan’s execution citing similar factors, including how he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder from his military service. Death Penalty Action’s petitions were delivered to the governor’s office Tuesday. 

During an afternoon news conference, Parchman Superintendent Marc McClure said Jordan seemed talkative and was telling stories about his past. He had been moved to a holding cell Sunday evening, and before the execution he visited with family, his attorneys and spiritual advisers. 

He requested chicken tenders, French fries, strawberry ice cream and a rootbeer float for his last meal, prison officials said at the earlier news conference. 

Starting in the afternoon, demonstrators gathered outside Parchman in the Delta and the Governor’s Mansion in Jackson. Death Penalty Action also hosted a virtual vigil. 

Minutes before the execution, a group gathered outside the prison entrance and offered prayers for Edwina Marter, her family, Jordan and his family. Among them were Rev. Jeff Hood, an Arkansas-based spiritual adviser who has accompanied 11 death row inmates to the execution chamber and has spoken out against the death penalty. 

Jordan’s execution is the third in the past decade, with the most recent taking place in December 2022. 

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CREATORS: The End May Be Near for Miranda v. Arizona

Matthew T. Mangino
CREATORS
June 24, 2025

Nearly 60 years ago, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart asked Attorney John J. Flynn, representing Ernesto Miranda before the court, what rights an accused should be advised of while in custody. Flynn replied, "(H)e had a right not to incriminate himself, that he had the right not to make any statement, that he had a right to be free from further questioning ... to be represented adequately by counsel in court, that if he was too indigent and poor to employ counsel, that the state would furnish him counsel."

So were born the Miranda warnings. The landmark Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona has become part of American culture. Miranda's conversion from legal holding to cultural icon is due mainly to the nation's insatiable appetite for television crime dramas. Everyone with a television has heard Miranda warnings.

What did Miranda do to earn his place in the American consciousness? In 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested for robbery. While in the midst of a custodial interrogation by police he confessed to raping an 18-year-old woman. At trial, prosecutors offered his confession into evidence. Miranda was convicted of rape and sentenced to prison. He appealed and his case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Miranda and excluded his confession. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the court's opinion finding a confession would be barred under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights and the suspect had waived them. Warren made it clear, "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."

As we soon mark 60 years since the decision in Miranda, it is important to note that the decision has remained far from pristine over the years. Nor was the ruling placed on a pedestal beyond the reach of activist courts — quite the contrary — the U.S. Supreme Court has continually tested, and at times, expanded and restricted the decision.

For instance, in 1981, the Edwards rule was established. The Court held that once an accused invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right could not be later established. The rule created a presumption that once a suspect invoked his right to the presence of counsel pursuant to Miranda, any waiver of that right in response to a subsequent police attempt at custodial interrogation was involuntary.

That changed in 2010. In a case out of Maryland, the Court established a bright-line rule finding that if at least 14 days passed from the time the suspect invoked his rights under Miranda, the police could again initiate an interrogation of the suspect.

Although the Miranda warnings are etched in nearly everyone's consciousness, the Supreme Court found that the police do not have to use those magical words to get the point across. In a 2010 case out of Florida, the court said as long as the rights are articulated to a suspect in a reasonable manner and the rights are understood, they are sufficient.

Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court decided a North Carolina case establishing for the first time that law enforcement must consider a suspect's juvenile status when carrying out the requirements of Miranda.

In 2022, the high Court held that a Miranda violation does not automatically translate into a constitutional violation actionable under the Civil Rights Act. The Court reasoned that Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards, not constitutional rights, and that a violation of these safeguards does not necessarily mean a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Miranda is ever evolving. The late Justice Antonin Scalia was a critic of Miranda, although he didn't have time to dismantle the ruling. With six conservative justices on the court, the end may be near.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book The Executioner's Toll, 2010 was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino

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Is calling out the National Guard strictly necessary for protection of federal property?

President Donald Trump’s controversial federalization of members of the California National Guard and his deployment of at least 700 active-duty Marines to Los Angeles has raised a series of novel, important, and challenging questions about the scope of the Executive Branch’s legal authorities when it comes to domestic use of the military, reported Just Security.

On one hand, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally forbids use of federal armed forces for civilian law enforcement unless a statute specifically authorizes it. Although the Insurrection Act has long been understood to be one such statute, Trump has, quite notably, not invoked it here. On the other hand, the Executive Branch (with a bit of help from the Supreme Court) has long claimed inherent power to use military force unilaterally to “protect federal functions,” including the power to defend federal property and federal personnel from violence. Thus, perhaps the dominant question Trump’s military deployment raises is the shape of the Venn diagram created by these two opposing forces. Are they mutually exclusive? If they overlap, which one prevails? Or put more basically, where does this “protective power” end, and (generally prohibited) law enforcement begin?

In our view, there are three possible answers to this question. On the first view, the protective power can include law enforcement—and overrides the Posse Comitatus Act when it does. On the second, the protective power, as an exercise of Article II authority, cannot be understood to include any typical law enforcement activity—and so such activity is unlawful unless specifically authorized by congressional statute. On the third, the answer is somewhere in between—where the protective power does not generally authorize law enforcement activity, but does when that activity is incidental to the protection of federal property and personnel (such as arresting individuals while they are attacking a federal building).

As we explain in the discussion that follows, we think that there are strong arguments to be made in support of both the second and third options—but not the first. More to the point, we think Congress has been far more clear than is widely believed about what its view is—in a way that calls into at least some question what the Trump administration has thus far used federal military forces for in and around Los Angeles.

1. Protective Power as an Exception to Posse Comitatus

The Posse Comitatus Act itself bars domestic use of the military “to execute the laws” “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” Obviously, nothing in the Constitution “expressly authorize[s]” the President to protect federal functions. Instead, such an Article II power is, at best, implicit—derived from some combination of the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause.

By itself, that ought to resolve any debate over whether any protection of a federal function is therefore exempted from the Posse Comitatus Act’s ban, whether it involves law enforcement or not. But there is also plenty of Founding-era history supporting the view that Congress, and not the President, would have broad power to define the circumstances in which the military could be used domestically. Indeed, the Insurrection Act itself derives from statutes Congress enacted in 1792 and 1795, both of which reflected the universal understanding at the time that the President could use military force “to execute the laws of the union” only if Congress had specifically authorized him to do so.

And, to its credit, the Department of Justice in the current litigation over the Los Angeles deployments has seemingly embraced this view. As it argued in its very first brief:

“Plaintiffs’ objection based on the Posse Comitatus Act is equally misdirected. Neither the National Guard nor the Marines are engaged in law enforcement. Rather, they are protecting law enforcement, consistent with longstanding practice and the inherent protective power to provide for the safety of federal property and personnel.” (emphasis in original)

(See also the most recent brief at p. 29).

Thus, not only do we find wholly unpersuasive any argument that the protective power overrides the Posse Comitatus Act; we don’t understand that to be the Trump administration’s litigating position, at least thus far.

Congress has been far more clear than is widely believed about what its view is—in a way that calls into at least some question what the Trump administration has thus far used federal military forces for in and around Los Angeles.

2. Posse Comitatus as a Law Enforcement Ban

At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that the protective power cannot fairly be understood to include any law enforcement functions—that it does not encompass searches, seizures, arrests, or any other activity similarly characteristic of law enforcement. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has interpreted the Posse Comitatus Act to prohibit any direct participation by the military in actions that “subject civilians to the exercise of military power that is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.” Thus, on this view, even where what might be viewed as law enforcement activity by the military is necessarily incidental to protecting federal buildings or personnel, it is still prohibited without clear congressional authorization.

Congress put at least a thumb on the scale in this direction in 1981—when it enacted what is present-day 10 U.S.C. § 275. Under that provision,

The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

Although this provision is focused on military support for civilian law enforcement agencies, the authoritative House Report is much clearer on how Congress understood the relationship between the protective power and the Posse Comitatus Act:

Certain military activities, although otherwise prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act, are permissible if expressly authorized by statute. These permissible military actions are specifically defined and are generally restricted to instances involving civil disorders (10 U.S.C. 331–36), disasters (42 U.S. 4401–84 and 1855), and threats to federal property (see letter from Mary C. Lawton, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Deanne Siemer, General Counsel, Department of Defense, March 24, 1978 at 3; see also United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1976). The other specific and “express” statutory exceptions to Posse Comitatus include: (1) 16 U.S.C. 23 and 16 U.S.C. 78 (protection of federal parks); (2) 18 U.S.C. 112(f) and 1116 (protection of foreign officials, official guests, and other internationally protected persons); (3) 18 U.S.C. 351 (crimes against members of congress); (4) 18 U.S.C. 1751 and 3056 (protection against crimes against the president); (5) 22 U.S.C. 408, and 461-462 (enforcement of the neutrality laws); (6) 42 U.S.C. 1989 (execution of warrants relating to certain violations of the civil rights laws); (7) 42 U.S.C. 3756 (loan of services, equipment, personnel and facilities to LEAA [Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]); (8) 43 U.S.C. 1065 (removal of unlawful enclosures from public lands); and (9) 50 U.S.C. 220 (enforcement of the customs laws).

Thus, § 375 was enacted against a backdrop in which the presumption is that activities are prohibited unless they are statutorily authorized. In a note accompanying the first sentence of the above passage, the House Report rules out any notion of a separate Article II authority in reference to the Posse Comitatus Act. The note states in full: “The statute permits constitutional exceptions. However, there are none.” Thus, Congress’s view appears to be that the protective power is not an “exception” to the Posse Comitatus Act; it is defined in such a way so as to not even implicate it.

Note: The Office of Legal Counsel has relied on the House Report and accompanying Conference Report as authoritative guides for determining the scope of permissible military action and the Posse Comitatus Act.

3. The Hybrid: Law Enforcement Only as Necessarily Incidental to Protection

Although we generally find Congress’s view satisfying, it raises one puzzle: What about the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Neagle, which held that the President did not need statutory authorization to appoint a deputy U.S. marshal to protect a Supreme Court Justice from an attempted assassination? Even if Deputy Neagle wasn’t exercising “law enforcement” authority when he shot and killed David Terry in defense of himself and Justice Field, it would be a very strange result if he had the power to shoot at Terry, but not to arrest and detain him. The point is not that Deputy Neagle had general law enforcement power; it’s that he had those powers that were necessary to discharge his (valid) duty to protect Justice Field.

We think the 1981 amendment can be read consistently with this view. As the 1981 Conference Report noted,

Nothing in this section, however, limits the inherent authority of military personnel to defend themselves or to protect federal property. Nothing in this chapter adversely affects the authority of the attorney general to request assistance from the department of defense under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 873(b). The limitation posed by this section is only with respect to assistance authorized under any part of this chapter.

[Update: Further to our point, the above passage might be read even more narrowly as an emergency exception. The House Report states: “Nothing in this section, however, changes the existing exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow military personnel to protect lives and federal property in emergency situations when they are involved in the performance of a lawful activity. For example, under current law, and under this proposal, nothing prohibits an air force pilot operating military aircraft from protecting him or herself from aggressive or destructive acts of a drug violator while on an authorized mission.” (We thank Chris Mirasola for this point.)]

Consistent with this understanding, long-standing Defense Department policies state that it is permissible for the military to engage in at least some law enforcement activity in the protection of federal government functions:

Permissible Direct Assistance. Categories of active participation in direct law enforcement-type activities (e.g., search, seizure, and arrest) that are not restricted by law or DoD policy are …

Federal military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because:
…
When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect Federal property or functions. (emphasis added).

The key, in our view, is the bolded language. The question is whether the specific search, seizure, and arrest are “necessary to protect Federal property or functions.” Sending armed troops along with ICE agents on immigration raids can’t possibly meet that test, whereas stationing troops in front of a federal building and authorizing them to arrest those who attack it is. It would also be completely unprecedented to use the protective function to protect enforcement officials – and in a way that entangles the military forces in the very act of law enforcement. The key, in our view, as reflected in both the 1981 enactment of § 275 and the Department of Defense’s own long-standing view, is that law enforcement qua law enforcement is strictly prohibited. Only if the compulsory action is necessary (and incidental) to the protection of federal property or personnel can it be said to have any basis in Article II of the Constitution.

Of course, law enforcement activities can be authorized by other statutes. But we’re not at all persuaded that 10 U.S.C. § 12406 is such a statute. And it would not resolve the use of the Marines. Thus, in our view, the central legal question arising out of the use of military force in and around Los Angeles is not whether the troops are engaged in any “law enforcement-like activities,” but whether those activities are strictly necessary (and incidental) to the protection of federal property and functions. Insofar as they are not, we believe they violate the Posse Comitatus Act.

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DOJ wants life in prison for man pardoned by President Trump

Federal prosecutors are asking a judge to sentence a Jan. 6 rioter to a lifetime behind bars—despite President Donald Trump pardoning his crimes at the U.S. Capitol, reported The Daily Beast.

Edward Kelley, a 35-year-old East Tennessee native, was convicted in November of conspiring to murder FBI agents and other officials who investigated his role in the Jan. 6 Capitol riots.

                                            Edward Kelly 'Make America Great Again'

Kelley was separately convicted of throwing a Capitol cop to the ground, with the help of others, and smashing a window with a piece of wood. However, those charges were wiped away by the president’s sweeping pardon of so-called “Jan. 6ers” in January. 

Edward Kelley was wearing a helmet, gloves, and a paint respirator when he entered the U.S. Capitol. / Department of Justice

Kelley has contested that Trump’s pardon of his Capitol crimes should also apply to his conviction for plotting to kill FBI agents and local law enforcement in Tennessee.

The Department of Justice disagrees. In a sentencing memorandum filed Tuesday, and first reported by Politico, they asked a judge to send Kelley to prison for the rest of his life.

“Kelley created a list of specific people he intended to assassinate, including agents, officers, and employees of the FBI, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, Tennessee Highway Patrol, Maryville Police Department, Blount County Sheriff’s Office, and Clinton Police Department,” the memorandum read. “To effectuate his plan, Kelley sought the assistance of others to identify his victims’ pattern of life and to murder them at their offices, homes, and in public places.”

Part of his alleged plan was to attack his local FBI office in Knoxville by using “improvised explosive devices attached to vehicles and drones.”

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States consider surgical castration as a punishment for sex crimes against children

 The Marshall Project expands on castration as punishment:

Last year, Louisiana sparked a slew of sensational headlines when state legislators passed a law allowing surgical castration as punishment for people convicted of sex crimes against children. That was the first successful legislation in a new wave of bills proposing both chemical and surgical castration in states such as New Mexico, Mississippi, and South Carolina.

This March, Oklahoma’s House of Representatives passed a bill that would make chemical castration a precondition of parole in sex offenses involving a child under the age of 13. As the bill headed over to the state senate, Republican Rep. Scott Fetgatter made its intent clear, saying, “I will fight for stricter laws against such offenders to better protect our kids.”

But while supporters of these bills echo that cause, many experts say the approach is needlessly cruel and lacks a sound scientific basis.

Castration — both reversible chemical and permanent surgical castration — does lead to the reduction of testosterone and a diminished libido. But “there is literally no evidence that testosterone is the driving factor of individuals committing crimes of a sexual nature,” said Kristen M. Budd, a senior analyst with the Sentencing Project, a research and advocacy organization working to reduce the number of people behind bars in the U.S.

Castration is not a new idea. According to the Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, doctors in the U.S. have been using hormone therapy — via off-label use of medications for conditions like prostate cancer — since the 1940s to lower the testosterone in men with “pathological sexual behavior.” Sandy Rozek, the communications director for the National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws, told The Marshall Project that she’s occasionally heard from people who want to avoid reoffending that the treatment plans they’ve created with their doctors have included surgical castration. Rozek draws a line between these self-appointed procedures and the criminal justice bills mandating castration as a condition of parole or as a court-ordered punishment.

“If your choice is between 10 more years in prison and castration, that’s not really a choice,” she said. “That’s coercion.”

The coercive nature of the state permanently or temporarily altering a man’s body in exchange for release is what led the courts in Michigan to deem the practice unlawful and experts like Budd to point out its similarity to 20th century eugenics, which resulted in the systematic sterilization of thousands of incarcerated women who were deemed “subnormal.”

Proponents like Democratic Louisiana Rep. Delisha Boyd, who co-authored the castration bill that became law in her state, believe that the harshness of the procedure is a self-evident deterrent against sex crime. Boyd, who comes from a family with a history of child sexual abuse, emphatically told NPR, “Even if just one rapist changes his mind about raping a child, I will take that.”

According to Gary Taylor, a researcher and professor who wrote an authoritative book on the history of castration, this strategy has long been practiced with the goal of inciting fear. Some ancient societies would kill enemies and cut off their testicles to intimidate future foes. The practice also permeated the antebellum and Jim Crow South, in which the extra-judicial lynchings of Black people were punctuated with castration as a form of White supremacist psychological terror, with the severed testicles often kept as souvenirs.

The bill Boyd co-authored made Louisiana the first state to allow judges to order surgical castration as a punishment, but there are at least 10 states that passed laws before 2008 to allow chemical or surgical castration as a condition of parole. California led the way in 1996. But despite these laws having been on the books for years, there is little information on how often states perform these procedures. A former sex crime prosecutor told the LAist in 2019 he never saw it done in Los Angeles.

Given the scant information available, the experts we spoke with are not aware of any concrete way to demonstrate that castration deters crime. But Rozek believes the claim is analogous to arguments made in favor of the death penalty, which numerous studies show offers no unique deterrent to violent crime. “People don’t stop and think about things like that when they are committing an offense,” she said. And like the death penalty, Budd is worried that when this punishment is performed, it will be done disproportionately to Black people who have White victims.

In terms of recidivism — whether a formerly incarcerated person reoffends — both Budd and Rozek note that people convicted of sex offenses are less likely than people convicted of other crimes to be rearrested after release. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics that followed the post-prison lives of people across 30 states released in 2005 found that about 67% of people convicted of sex offenses were rearrested in the nine years following their release, compared with about 84% of people convicted of other crimes.

For those at risk of reoffending, they point to treatment programs, like cognitive behavioral therapy — which studies have consistently found to reduce sexual recidivism — over the unknowns of castration. Budd also notes that castration can further ostracize those who have committed crimes of a sexual nature. Instead of states investing millions into post-release punishments, such as sex offender registries, she believes society would be safer if lawmakers “actually created spaces for people who may have attraction to children to go seek help without fear.”

While a castration bill in South Carolina is still working its way through the legislature, and one in Oklahoma was withdrawn from an appropriation committee, the bills proposed earlier this year in New Mexico, Iowa and Mississippi have died. Rozek takes no solace in this. “The first year out, most of the bills won't pass,” she said. “But this is just the first phase. They will come back.”

Similarly, Budd believes that with the bipartisan passing of the surgical castration law in Louisiana, we could see this punishment be adopted for other crimes. “It happened with sex offense registries,” she said. “Now you have violent offender registries in states like Ohio and Oklahoma that list people’s home address and their vehicle information once they're released from prison.”

While these punitive bills can boost legislators on both sides of the aisle hoping to look tough on crime, Budd warns that they can doom the formerly incarcerated looking for a clean start. “These laws take away hope, chance for change, and human dignity.”

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President Teddy Roosevelt's thoughts on dissent

 "To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public." 

-Theodore Roosevelt